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“Plaintiff could not fairly have been charged with notice of facts
which he could have learned only out of the mouths of the
conspirators, who were successfully endeavoring to conceal
them.” 1

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 23, 2013, California Senate Bill 538 became law,
conforming the anti-fraud provision of California securities law to
Rule 10b-5, the federal anti-fraud provision promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 2 If courts interpret
the amended California law consistently with federal courts’
interpretations of the now virtually identical Rule 10b-5, securities
fraud victims will face new, onerous “pleading hurdle[s].” 3 Plaintiffs

1. Sime v. Malouf, 212 P.2d 946, 960-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
2. S.B. 538, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), 2013 Cal. Stat. ch. 335. The bill
“[e]nsures consistency with federal law by updating anti-fraud provisions in the
Securities law.” S.B. 538 Bill Analysis, Assemb. Comm. on Banking and Fin. (June
10, 2013), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_538_
cfa_20130607_121212_asm_comm.html. As amended, section 25401 of the
California Corporations Code reads:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of a security, directly or indirectly, to do any of the following:
(a) Employ a devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud. (b) Make an untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading. (c) Engage in an act, practice, or course of
business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another
person.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014). Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, with the purchase or sale of any security.
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
3. Michael Mugmon et al., United States: California Overhauls State AntiSecurities Fraud Statute, MONDAQ (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/
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suing under Rule 10b-5 would then need to plead and prove the
judicially-imposed elements—scienter, reliance, and causation—
which have never before been required under the anti-fraud provision
of California securities law. 4 For that reason, the time is ripe for
courts to reject the particularly harsh statute of limitations governing
California’s anti-fraud provisions.
Even under the previous version of California’s anti-fraud
provision, 5 which relieved plaintiffs of pleading these elements, 6 the
statute of limitations posed a dilemma for aggrieved investors. The
statute of limitations for securities fraud under California law begins
to run when the plaintiff discovers “the facts constituting the
violation,” 7 but courts can impute “discovery” to plaintiffs before they
even realize they have been defrauded. 8 This judicial practice can rob
securities fraud victims of any chance of recovery and give a complete
defense to defendants who succeed in concealing their fraud because

unitedstates/x/267150/Securities/California+Overhauls+AntiSecurities+Fraud+Statu
te.
4. Ethan Brown, California Amends Its State Securities Fraud Provision,
ETHAN BROWN LAW (Oct. 7, 2013), http://ethanbrownlawblog.com/californiaamends-its-state-securities-fraud-provision/.
5. Before it was amended by S.B. 538, see supra note 2, section 25401 of the
California Corporations Code read:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy
or offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral
communication which includes an untrue statement of material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014).
6. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878 (Ct. App. 1977). Though a
plaintiff need not plead reliance, causation, or intent, section 25401 is not a strict
liability violation. A defendant is afforded a complete defense if he can: “(1) prove
that he exercised reasonable care and did not know of the untruth or omission, (2)
show that even if he had exercised reasonable care, he would not have known of the
untruth or omission, and (3) show that the plaintiff knew the facts concerning the
untruth or omission.” Id.
7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 2014) (requiring that actions be
brought no later than “two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the violation”).
8. See discussion infra Parts III.D, IV.D.1.
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the limitations period may expire long before the would-be plaintiff
has gathered enough facts to file a viable complaint. 9
The rule that allows this unjust outcome is called “inquiry
notice.” 10 Inquiry notice imposes a duty of inquiry upon a victim of
fraud, which arises as soon as facts are available to the victim
suggestive of the possibility of fraud. 11 When circumstances arise
which suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence that he may have
been defrauded, 12 and the investor “makes no inquiry,” knowledge of
the fraud is imputed to the investor as of the date the duty arose. 13 If
the investor does investigate, the investor will be charged with
knowledge of the fraud as of the date the investor, exercising
reasonable diligence, would have discovered the fraud. 14 Therefore,
inquiry notice may trigger the limitations period before the investor
actually knows he or she has been defrauded. 15 Even where the
investor suspects fraud and diligently investigates, the limitations
period may expire before the investor can gather enough facts to draft
a viable complaint because plaintiffs must meet heightened pleading
standards for fraud. 16
9. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
10. See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815 (Ct. App. 2006).
11. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 822 (“[O]nce placed on inquiry notice by
storm warnings, an investor must perform a reasonable investigation into the
possibility of fraud.”).
12. “Such circumstances are often [called] ‘storm warnings.’” Dodds v. Cigna
Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d
685, 697 (1st Cir. 1978)).
13. Id.; see, e.g., Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
170679 WHA, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (dismissing complaint as four
months too late because inquiry notice triggered the running of the limitations period
when plaintiffs first became aware of fraudulent conduct).
14. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 822 (citing Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc.
175 F.3d 669, 704, 706 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1999)).
15. See, e.g., Wright, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *9-10 (finding that
under inquiry notice, limitations period began to run before plaintiffs even knew
they had participated in a securities offering).
16. See Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 199, 210 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Fraud allegations must be pled with more detail
than other causes of action. The facts constituting the fraud, including every
element of the cause of action, must be alleged ‘factually and specifically.’”
(quoting Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d
660, 672 (Cal. 1983))).
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Given the likelihood that courts will impose even more exacting
pleading requirements on securities fraud victims suing under
California’s amended anti-fraud provisions, California should reject
inquiry notice. 17 Instead, the statute of limitations for securities fraud
should accrue upon discovery of facts constituting each element of the
violation. This would provide investors with time to investigate the
fraud, gather facts supporting each element of their claim, and plead
with the particularity required for a fraud claim Not only is this
interpretation of the statute of limitations consistent with the plain
meaning of the text of the statute, it is also consistent with the
apparent legislative intent. 18
Part II of this note provides background on securities fraud and
the purpose and policies behind statutes of limitations, particularly as
statutes of limitations apply to private rights of action for securities
fraud. Part III describes anti-fraud provisions in securities law
including private rights of action under both California and federal
securities law, as well as their respective statutes of limitations. This
part highlights the inconsistencies between the purposes of private
enforcement of securities laws, the policies purportedly served by
statutes of limitations, and inquiry notice. Part IV recommends that
California reject inquiry notice in favor of a discovery-based standard.
The plain language of the statute of limitations supports a discoverybased standard, and the Supreme Court has rejected inquiry notice for
securities fraud claims under nearly identical federal law. 19 More
importantly, inquiry notice unfairly rewards fraudsters for concealing

17. Whether courts will require plaintiffs to plead the judicially-imposed
elements of Rule 10b-5 to sustain a claim under California state securities law
remains to be seen. Former Commissioner of the Department of Corporations (now
the Department of Business Oversight) Keith Bishop opined, “It will probably be a
very long time until the courts will untangle the Gordian knot tied by the legislature
when it enacted SB 538.” Keith Bishop, California Creates Complete Chaos By
Rewriting Anti-Fraud Statute, But “We Are Against Fraud Aren’t We?”,
CORP.
L.
BLOG
(Sept.
24,
2013),
CALIFORNIA
http://calcorporatelaw.com/2013/09/california-creates-complete-chaos-by-rewritinganti-fraud-statute-but-we-are-against-fraud-arent-we/. Even if the amendment does
not create a higher pleading standard, inquiry notice should be rejected for reasons
set forth in Part IV.D, infra.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.C-D.
19. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010).
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their schemes and undermines the purposes of private enforcement—
detering of fraud and providing restitution for victims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Securities Fraud
The term “security” includes “the commonly known documents
traded for speculation or investment.” 20 But securities are more than
just stocks and bonds. Securities also include “investment contracts,”
a broad term encompassing a wide array of schemes through which
individuals are led to invest money “in a common enterprise with
profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” 21 This flexible
judicial definition of investment contract acknowledges the “countless
and variable schemes” devised by innovative “promoters” to trick
individuals into parting with money. 22
Indeed, securities fraud takes many forms. In California, spikes in
oil prices have triggered increases in fraudulent oil-related investment
offerings. 23 Another form of securities fraud in California is the
“prime bank scheme,” in which investors are induced to pool their
money with other investors’ money by the promise of high returns
from offshore banks which normally limit their services to the superrich. 24 Due to recent rule changes that the SEC has promulgated
pursuant to the JOBS Act, 25 states, as the primary regulators of
securities registration, will likely face a new wave of fraudulent
schemes carried out under the pretense of a private placement
exemption from registration. 26 The SEC recently lifted the 80-year

20.
21.
22.
23.

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 299.
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T. OF CORPORATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO
CORPORATE
SECURITIES
LAW
(2006),
available
at
THE
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Licensees/Corporate_Securities_Law/pdf/doc37.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
26. See A. HEATH ABSHURE, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA COMMENTS
IN RESPONSE TO RELEASE NO. 33-9354 (FILE NO. S7-07-12), “ELIMINATING THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST GENERAL SOLICITATION AND GENERAL ADVERTISING IN
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ban on general solicitations for private securities offerings. 27
Fraudsters can now take advantage of this lift on consumer protection
by marketing their schemes through social media and other forms of
advertising to unsophisticated, inexperienced investors, which will
certainly lead to an increase in securities fraud. 28
The anticipated increase in securities fraud warrants a reexamination of the state securities laws because “[s]ecurities fraud
produces . . . social costs that may justify regulation.” 29 “First, fraud
increases the cost of capital” because investors who “fear that issuers
will defraud them . . . discount the price they are willing to pay for
securities,” and may even shy away from securities markets
altogether. 30 Second, securities fraud “upset[s] the efficient allocation
of resources” because stock will not be valued correctly. 31 It follows
that an “effective deterrence regime . . . reduce[s] these social costs”
by “bring[ing] skittish investors back” to securities markets and
improving the allocation of resources. 32
Securities laws provide for private rights of action because private
enforcement supplements enforcement efforts by regulatory bodies,
allows aggrieved investors to recover money lost in fraudulent
investment schemes, and helps ensure the integrity of the securities
RULE
506
AND
RULE
144A”
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf.
27. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 339415 (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf.
28. Top Investor Threats, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nasaa.org/3752/top-investor-threats/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
29. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2179 (2010).
30. Id. Rose explains how securities fraud increases the cost of capital, not
only with respect to primary offerings, but also on the secondary market.
31. Id. “If fraud is rampant, investors may be unable to distinguish between
good and bad firms and may therefore pay too little for securities of the former and
too much for securities of the latter. As a result, ‘companies whose stock is
overvalued may raise too much equity and overinvest. On the other hand,
companies whose stock is undervalued may find it costly or impracticable to obtain
sufficient capital from alternative sources, and thus underinvest.’” Id. (quoting
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1010 (1992)).
32. Id. at 2180.
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markets. 33 Courts have acknowledged the important role of “private
litigation in enforcing ethical corporate behavior and obtaining
restitution for harmed investors,” 34 and have recognized an implied
private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for over forty years. 35
Between 1998 and 2003, private enforcers recovered nearly four times
more in investor losses than the SEC. 36
B. Policies Served by Statutes of Limitations
A statute of limitations requires that claims be brought within a
prescribed period of time after a cause of action arises and serves as a
complete bar to claims that are not brought within that time limit.37
The purpose of statutes of limitations is twofold: to encourage
plaintiffs to bring suit before “evidence of meritorious claims . . .
become[s] stale” and to provide certainty for potential defendants that
after a certain period of time, they will not be sued. 38 Limitation
periods, then, are premised on the theory that “at some point, the
[interest in limiting stale claims and relieving potential defendants of
uncertainty] prevails over the right of a plaintiff to bring its claim.” 39
In the context of securities fraud, additional considerations inform
statutes of limitations. Corporate issuers of securities are often the
defendants in securities fraud litigation, 40 and a company that is
“distracted by the threat of litigation” is “less likely to devote

33. Id. at 2174; Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just
Measure of Repose: The Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2011).
34. Nishal Ray Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the
Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United States, RAND CORP. 13 (2007).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2007/RAND_RGSD2
24.pdf .
35. Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-tion: A New Paradigm for Construing the Statute
of Limitations in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 691 n.49
(2010).
36. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 22.
37. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 2 (2000).
38. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1551.
39. Cosenza, supra note 35, at 686.
40. Between 1998 and 2004, “84.2% of class action [securities fraud]
defendants [were] public corporations.” Ramphal, supra note 34, at 2-4.
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resources to productive purposes.” 41 Moreover, defending class
action securities fraud lawsuits is “costly,” not only to the defendant
corporation but also to the public. 42 Even in the wake of the most
recent financial crisis, more than half of all American adults have
money invested in the stock market, 43 so securities fraud statutes of
limitations must serve the additional interest of minimizing liability
exposure for “large numbers of innocent [stockholders].” 44
On the other hand, the overall health of the economy depends, to a
large extent, on the integrity of securities markets, which in turn
depends on private enforcement to deter securities issuers from
engaging in fraud. 45 When investors lose money because of the
“failure of regulatory authorities to detect [corporate] wrongdoing,”
the “overall willingness of the public to invest” decreases, which
“hinders the formation of capital.” 46 This “lead[s] ultimately to lower
levels of economic growth than could otherwise have been
achieved.” 47 Thus, the cost of private enforcement of securities laws
to corporate defendants and the public “must be measured against the
deterrence of fraud and the increase in public confidence in the
securities market that more robust private securities litigation . . . has
fostered.” 48 Therefore, the role of private enforcement in the
protection of investors, the efficiency of capital markets, and the

41. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1551.
42. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 5. Who ultimately bears the costs of securities
litigation—the defendant corporation, its shareholders, or the public—is a “complex
question.” Id. at 100-01.
43. Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP (May 8,
2013), www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx.
44. Cosenza, supra note 35, at 687.
45. See Ramphal, supra note 34, at 13.
46. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 1. Ramphal also notes:
[T]he link between private and public enforcement mechanisms has taken
on added significance in recent years following the corporate scandals and
bankruptcies at a host of leading companies, beginning with Enron in
2001. Regulatory authorities were roundly condemned for failing to
detect the wrongdoing, and subsequently to obtain adequate investor
restitution.
Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id. at 5.
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health of the economy should not be undervalued, nor should it be
thwarted by an overly obstructive statute of limitations.
III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT FOR SECURITIES FRAUD
A. Private Rights of Action Under Federal Securities Laws
“Federal [securities] regulation . . . emerged as part of the
aftermath of the market crash in 1929.” 49 The laws were “designed to
provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning [issuers of securities, and] to protect investors against
fraud” and “manipulation of stock prices.” 50 The Securities Act of
1933 (“Securities Act”) requires that public securities offerings be
registered and that investors be given a prospectus containing material
information about the issuer and its offering. 51 The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) requires periodic disclosure
of material information. 52 It also created the SEC and provided it
“with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers.” 53
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates liability for those
who make a material misrepresentation in connection with the sale of
securities. 54
Liability under [this provision] attaches if . . . (1) the defendant
made a false or misleading statement of material fact or failed to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement not
misleading; (2) the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or
49. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). The stock market
crash of 1929 led to the Great Depression, “the longest economic downturn in
American history.” U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SENATE
RESOLUTIONS 84 AND 239 (THE PECORA COMMITTEE), NOTABLE SENATE
INVESTIGATIONS
1,
available
at
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/investigations/pdf/Pecora_investigation_citations.pdf. In 1932, Senate
Resolution 84 authorized the Committee on Banking and Currency to investigate
stock market practices. Id. Congress “rel[ied] heavily on the revelations”
uncovered by the committee in drafting and passing the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 3.
50. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
51. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77l (2012).
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012).
53. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
54. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
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omission; and (3) the defendant knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence could have known, of the untruth or
omission. 55

Section 12(a)(2) differs from common law fraud in that reliance,
causation, and scienter are not elements. 56
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to the power
conferred by § 10 of the Exchange Act. 57 Rule 10b-5 makes it
unlawful for any person to make a material misrepresentation “‘in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.’” 58 The rule was
adopted “primarily [to] impos[e] . . . liability upon buyers of
securities,” because the “scheme of civil liability in the Securities
Act . . . applies only to an action [brought] by a buyer of securities
against a seller.” 59 However, a “spokesman for its drafters”
“described [it] rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause . . . ‘to deal with new
manipulative (or cunning) devices.’” 60 Though Rule 10b-5 “does
not . . . provide for an express civil remedy,” the courts have read into
the rule an implied private right of action for victims of securities
fraud. 61 A plaintiff suing under Rule 10b-5 must prove elements that
are similar to the elements of common law fraud: a false or misleading
statement or omission of material information; reliance; causation; and
scienter. 62

55. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Alton Box
Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977)).
56. ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int’l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061,
1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). “The primary difference between a § 12(2) action and a
fraud action is that in the former plaintiffs need not show scienter, reliance or loss
causation.” Id.
57. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975); see
also SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
58. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 (quoting SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5).
59. HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 442 (1969).
60. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
61. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
62. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
376-77 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Once federal jurisdiction is established, a
§ 10(b) plaintiff must prove elements that are similar to those in actions for
common-law fraud. Each requires proof of a false or misleading statement or
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B. Private Rights of Action Under California Securities Laws
California enacted its first comprehensive scheme of securities
regulation in 1917. 63 It lacked any civil remedy, except that a security
issued without a permit could be deemed “void,” entitling the
purchaser to restitution. 64 The legislative scheme provided no remedy
for a purchaser of securities in a transaction where the issuer was
guilty of intentional fraud, so long as the issuer complied with the
permit requirement. 65
The drafters of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 were
“concerned” with the lack of “adequate civil . . . remedies for
defrauded investors.” 66 Thus, the drafters “modeled” the new “civil
liability provisions” upon those found in the federal Securities and
Exchange Acts. 67 Like § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, section 25401
of the California Corporations Code 68 prohibits material
misrepresentation in connection with a security. Like Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act, section 25401 imposes liability upon both buyer
and seller. 69 Unlike § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, only actual
purchasers or sellers of the securities may be liable under section
25401. 70 Section 25504, however, extends liability to enumerated
individuals who materially aid in the fraud, including officers,
directors, and broker-dealers, 71 and section 25504.1 extends liability

material omission, reliance thereon, damages caused by the wrongdoing, and
scienter on the part of the defendant.” (citations omitted)).
63. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 59, at 4.
64. Id. at 15-16.
65. See id. at 16.
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 436.
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014). Hereinafter, all statutory
references are to the California Corporations Code, unless otherwise noted.
69. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 59, at 447.
70. Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d
199, 221 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that while a “seller” under § 12 of the Securities
Act has been construed to include anyone who solicits the purchase or sale of a
security, under section 25401 liability attaches only to the actual seller of the
security).
71. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (West
2014).
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to any person who aids in the violation with the intent to deceive. 72
Thus, California’s anti-fraud provisions do not perfectly mirror the
federal laws, but the civil liability created under each scheme is
similar. While section 25401 was originally modeled after § 12(a)(2)
of the Securities Act, the California legislature has recently amended
section 25401 so that it is now virtually identical to Rule 10b-5, 73
which was promulgated under the authority granted to the SEC by the
Exchange Act.
C. Statutes of Limitations for Private Rights of Action
Under Federal Law
The statute of limitations for § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act is
governed by § 13 of the Securities Act, which requires that a plaintiff
bring suit “within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement
or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence.” 74 The statute also provides an
absolute three-year limit from the time of the violation. 75
Because the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is a “judicial
creation,” it has no express statute of limitations in the Exchange
Act. 76 Before 1991, the circuit courts disagreed about the appropriate
statute of limitations; for instance, some “borrowed . . . from the
closest analogous state-law cause of action” while others looked to §
13 of the Securities Act. 77
The Supreme Court attempted to settle the disagreement in Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson. 78 The Court
reasoned that “the federal interests in predictability and judicial
economy” favored the adoption of a uniform statute of limitations for
actions brought under Rule 10b-5, and, therefore, looked to the

72. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODe § 25504.1 (West
2014).
73. See supra note 2.
74. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
75. Id.
76. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
358 (1991).
77. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1559-60.
78. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 352-64.
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statutes of limitations in the Securities and Exchange Acts. 79 But the
Court did not adopt the language of § 13 of the Securities Act; instead,
it borrowed from § 9(e) of the Exchange Act. The Court held that a
suit under Rule 10b-5 “must be commenced within one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years
after such violation.” 80 Thus, the new statute of limitations for Rule
10b-5 differed from the Securities Act statute of limitations in that the
former did not, by its terms, require “reasonable diligence” on the part
of the plaintiff. 81 Despite this distinction, most circuits after Lampf
imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on plaintiffs bringing suit
under Rule 10b-5 by applying the inquiry notice rule. 82
The Tenth and Ninth Circuits recognized the distinction between
inquiry notice—the point at which “there exists sufficient suspicion of
fraud to cause a reasonable investor to investigate the matter
further” 83—and the later point at which the plaintiff “in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts underlying the
alleged fraud.” 84 The Tenth Circuit noted that “inquiry notice alone
may not be the determinative factor, at least when a reasonable
investor could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the
alleged fraud until some time after being placed on inquiry notice.”85
The Ninth Circuit followed that rationale in adopting the Tenth
Circuit’s inquiry-plus-reasonable-diligence-test, holding that “[o]nce a
plaintiff has inquiry notice, we ask when the investor, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts constituting
79. Id. at 357-58.
80. Id. at 364.
81. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides that “[n]o action shall be
maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77ll(a)(2) of this
title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of
reasonable diligence . . . .” Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012) (emphasis
added).
82. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 646 (2010) ( “Subsequently,
every Court of Appeals to decide the matter [post-Lampf] held that ‘discovery of the
facts constituting the violation’ occurs not only once a plaintiff actually discovers
the facts, but also when a hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
discovered them.”).
83. Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 486 F.3d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 2007).
84. Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 1196.
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the alleged fraud. The answer to that second question tells us when
the statute of limitations began to run.” 86
Other circuits’ formulations of inquiry notice imposed a duty of
reasonable diligence on plaintiffs, and some courts timed the
limitations period from the date the duty of inquiry arose. The Sixth
Circuit held that the statute of limitations was not triggered until a
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered facts constituting
the violation, but that inquiry notice triggered a duty to investigate. 87
Similarly, the First Circuit held that the statute of limitations began to
run not upon inquiry notice, but upon the later date at which the
plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, would have discovered the
fraud. 88 It employed a burden-shifting formulation of inquiry notice,
whereby if the defendant met the “initial burden of establishing the
existence of [storm] warnings,” the plaintiff then bore the burden of
showing she “fulfilled her corresponding duty of making a reasonably
diligent inquiry into the possibility of fraudulent activity.” 89 The
Second Circuit’s approach was to time the statute of limitations “two
different ways, depending on whether the investor undertakes some
inquiry.” 90 The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits held that the statute of
limitations began to run when the plaintiff was put on inquiry notice,
and that inquiry notice was triggered by evidence of the mere
possibility of fraud. 91 In summary, Lampf failed to create a uniform
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5.
86. Betz, 486 F.3d at 596.
87. New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336
F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003).
88. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).
89. Id. at 9.
90. LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d
Cir. 2003) (“If the investor makes no inquiry once the duty arises, knowledge will be
imputed as of the date the duty arose. However, if the investor makes some inquiry
once the duty arises, we will impute knowledge of what an investor ‘in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered’ concerning the fraud, and in such
cases the limitations period begins to run from the date such inquiry should have
revealed the fraud.” (quoting Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000))).
91. E.g., Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 126 F. App’x. 593, 597 (4th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the statute of limitations “begins to run when the plaintiff is put on
inquiry notice of the facts constituting the alleged violation,” and that a “plaintiff’s
awareness of the possibility of fraud, not complete exposure of the fraud, triggers
inquiry notice.”); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001)
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In 2002, in the wake of numerous high-profile financial disasters
such as Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to strengthen
investor protection. 92 Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
increased the statute of limitations for private actions brought pursuant
to the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws to the earlier of
five years after the act or omission, or two years after discovery of the
facts constituting the action. 93 However, the amendment did not
clarify which formulation of the inquiry notice standard was correct,
nor did it address whether inquiry notice was the proper standard at
all. 94
In 2010, the Supreme Court had the opportunity in Merck & Co.,
Inc. v. Reynolds to settle what “discovery of the facts constituting the
violation” meant for the purposes of the statute of limitations for
securities fraud. 95 Investors sued pharmaceutical company Merck &
Co. for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
(explaining that inquiry notice “‘is triggered by evidence of the possibility of fraud,
not full exposition of the scam itself,’” but ignoring Sterlin’s second step in holding
that inquiry notice starts the statute of limitations (quoting Sterlin v. Biomune Sys.,
154 F.3d 1191, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998))), abrogated by Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010); Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157,
162 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Inquiry notice is triggered by evidence of the possibility of
fraud, not by complete exposure of the alleged scam.”).
92. See Cosenza, supra note 31, at 718 n.215.
93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 28 U.S.C § 1658(b) (2006) (“[A] private right
of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . may be
brought not later than the earlier of–(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”).
94. Compare, e.g., Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 871 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“The existence of inquiry notice is only the first prong of the two-part
notice-plus-reasonable-diligence test that we are today adopting, and the second
stage of that inquiry, the question of whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable
diligence in investigating the facts underlying the alleged fraud . . . necessarily
entails an assessment of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances from the perspective
of a reasonable investor.”), and Shah v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2006)
(if the plaintiff investigates, limitations period begins at “date such inquiry should
have revealed the fraud,” but if the plaintiff does not investigate, limitations period
begins upon inquiry notice), with New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (limitations period never
begins before a reasonably diligent plaintiff, after being placed on inquiry notice,
would have discovered facts constituting the violation).
95. Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 633.
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10b-5, alleging that the company knowingly misrepresented the heartattack risks associated with its drug Vioxx.96 The district court
dismissed the case as time barred because the plaintiffs were aware of
facts that alerted them to a “‘possibility that Merck had knowingly
misrepresented material facts’” two years and one month before the
complaint was filed. 97 The district court found that those facts put the
plaintiffs on “inquiry notice,” which they failed to dutifully
investigate. 98 The district court ultimately held the statute of
limitations began to run at that time and imputed knowledge of the
“facts constituting the violation” as of the date that the plaintiffs
should have been aware of the possibility of fraud. 99 On appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed, finding that the events constituting “storm
warnings” “did not suggest much by way of scienter,” 100 which is a
fact constituting the violation. 101
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari to resolve the
disagreements among the courts of appeals regarding the statute of
limitations. The Supreme Court rejected inquiry notice as triggering
the statute of limitations, defining inquiry notice as “the point where
the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate
further,” because “that point is not necessarily the point at which the
plaintiff would already have discovered facts showing scienter or
other ‘facts constituting the violation.’” 102 The Court further noted,
“[n]othing in the text suggests that the limitations period can
sometimes begin before ‘discovery’ can take place.” 103

96. Id. at 637-38.
97. Id. at 643 (quoting In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA”
Litigation, 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D.N.J. 2007).
98. Id. (“[P]laintiffs had failed to ‘show that they exercised reasonable due
diligence but nevertheless were unable to discover their injuries . . . .’” (quoting In
re Merck & Co., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 423)).
99. Id. at 642-43.
100. Scienter means “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). However, certain forms of
recklessness may be considered intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability. Id. at 193 n.12.
101. Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 643 (citing In re Merck & Co. Securities,
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 543 F.3d 150, 172 (3d Cir. 2008)).
102. Id. at 651.
103. Id.
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Thus, the Court made clear that the statute of limitations “begins
to run [at the earlier of] once a plaintiff did discover or a reasonably
diligent plaintiff would have” discovered enough facts to draft a viable
complaint. 104 While the holding in Merck is limited to federal
securities laws and is not binding authority with respect to California’s
anti-fraud provisions, it should be instructive because the pertinent
language of Corporations Code section 25506 is identical to the statute
of limitations that the Supreme Court construed in Merck. 105
D. Statutes of Limitations for Private Rights of Action Under
California Law
The statute of limitations for the anti-fraud provisions of
California securities law mirrors the statute of limitations for Rule
10b-5. Until 2004, section 25506 provided that an action for
securities fraud must be brought “before the expiration of four years
after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the expiration
of one year after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting
the violation, whichever shall first expire.” 106 In 2004, the legislature
amended the statute to extend the limitations period to the earlier of
five years after the act or two years after discovery of the facts
constituting the violation. 107 The bill’s author, Representative Correa,
noted that the amendment was needed to “conform California’s statute
of limitations for securities fraud actions to the federal statute of
limitations as set by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, so that state law
is at least as protective of California investors as federal law.” 108

104. Id. at 653.
105. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
106. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506 (West
2014).
107. A.B. 2167, ch. 575, § 3, 2004 Leg. Serv. (West) (codified as amended at
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b)); see also Securities: Corporate Liability: Hearing on
Assemb. B. 2167 Before the Comm. on Banking and Fin., 2004 Leg., 2003-04 Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2004),
available
at
http://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_20040330_104037_asm_comm.html.
108. Unlicensed Security Brokers: Hearing on Assemb. B. 2166 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 2004 Leg., 2003-04 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2004) (comments of
Rep. Correa), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_21512200/ab_2167_cfa_20040623_121942_sen_comm.html.
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The language of the California statute of limitations is now
identical to Rule 10b-5’s statute of limitations and the clear legislative
intent was to follow Rule 10b-5. But several California courts, unlike
the Supreme Court, have embraced inquiry notice. 109 In Deveny v.
Entropin, Inc., the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
held that inquiry notice is sufficient to begin the limitations period
under section 25506. 110
The facts of Deveny are similar to the facts of Merck, the case in
which the Supreme Court rejected inquiry notice. 111 In Deveny, a
group of investors sued pharmaceutical company Entropin, Inc. for
securities fraud under California law, “alleging that [the company]
fraudulently concealed . . . negative clinical data that revealed [its
developmental drug] was ineffective.” 112 From 1998 until September
of 2002, Entropin’s filings with the SEC and its press releases
indicated that clinical trials showed that its developmental drug was
effective. 113 During this period, Entropin “sold shares of common
stock and warrants to the public.” 114 “In September 2002, however,
Entropin issued a press release stating that its clinical trials had been a
failure” and that it was “abandoning the drug.” 115 Entropin’s
securities price “collapsed,” and four months later investors filed a
securities fraud class action, alleging they purchased Entropin’s
securities in reliance on its misrepresentations about the clinical
trials. 116

109. Jackson v. Fisher, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wright
v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2012); Hardisty v. Moore, No. 11cv1591 AJB (BLM), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61465, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Hernandez v. Vasquez, B244533, 2013 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 8074, at *20-23 (Nov. 7, 2013); Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42
Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (Ct. App. 2006).
110. Id. Though the case was decided in 2006, the alleged violations occurred
before 2002. Id. at 811-12. Thus, the court did not address the 2004 amendment to
Section 25506 (which applies only to violations occurring on or after January 1,
2005). CORP. CODE §25506.
111. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810-12.
112. Id. at 812-13.
113. Id. at 811-12.
114. Id. at 811.
115. Id. at 812.
116. Id.
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Entropin moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
action was untimely. 117 Entropin cited blood and urine data, which
was available on its website more than a year before the plaintiffs filed
their complaint, arguing that the data indicated that the developmental
drug was ineffective. 118 The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment, holding that the availability of the data on the
website put the investors on inquiry notice beyond the statutory
period, and the investors appealed. 119
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed
the lower court’s decision, but rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
actual notice, rather than inquiry notice, was the correct standard. 120
The court held that inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the running of
the limitations period under section 25506, 121 but reversed only
because it found that the blood and urine data on the website could
not, as a matter of law, establish inquiry notice. 122
The Supreme Court may have laid to rest the knotty concept of
inquiry notice in Merck, but inquiry notice is alive and well in
California, where Deveny is still cited as good law. 123 The result of
this inconsistency is that California law is less protective of investors

117. Id.
118. Id. at 813.
119. Id. at 814-15.
120. Id. at 817.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 823-24.
123. E.g., Jackson v. Fisher, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(motion to dismiss securities fraud claim under California law granted based on
statute of limitations, with leave to amend, though plaintiff alleged that she
discovered the fraud less than two years before the complaint was filed); Wright v.
Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2012) (“Inquiry notice is triggered when a person becomes aware of
financial, legal, or other information that suggests (to an investor of reasonable
intelligence) that he or she had been defrauded.”); Hardisty v. Moore, No. 11cv1591
AJB (BLM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61465, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“The statute of
limitations provided under Section 25506 is subject to the inquiry notice rule.”);
Hernandez v. Vasquez, B244533, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8074, at *20-23
(Nov. 7, 2013) (holding that inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the statute of
limitations, and that while inquiry notice is generally an issue of fact, it may be
established as a matter of law where the “underlying facts are undisputed and
subject to only one reasonable” interpretation).
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than federal law, which is directly contrary to the stated purpose of the
2004 amendment to section 25506. 124
IV. CALIFORNIA SHOULD REJECT INQUIRY NOTICE
The rationale supporting the Supreme Court’s holding in Merck
applies with equal force to Corporations Code section 25506, but stare
decisis commands that California lower courts follow Deveny. 125 But
precedent need not be respected when “adherence to it puts us on a
course that is sure error.” 126 Moreover, when a prior decision is not
well reasoned and is unworkable, a court may overrule it. 127 Deveny
was not well reasoned because it ignored the maxim that “a statute’s
plain meaning should be given priority in its construction.”128
Furthermore, Deveny contradicts the legislative intent of the 2004
amendment to section 25506. 129 Finally, the unjust consequences of
inquiry notice make Deveny’s holding unworkable, especially in light
of the recent amendment to section 25401, which imposes judiciallycreated elements on a securities fraud claim. 130
A. Deveny Was Not Well Reasoned
In Deveny, the court conspicuously ignored crucial distinctions in
the statutory language of section 25506 and § 13 of the Securities Act.
In holding that inquiry notice was sufficient to start the limitations
period for securities fraud under California law, the court noted that
124. See supra note 108.
125. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”).
126. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
127. Id. at 362-63 (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 779 (2009));
see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (“[Despite the importance of stare decisis,] when
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned” courts are not
constrained to follow precedent.).
128. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 665 F.2d 1126, 1137
(D.C. Cir. 1981). “[The maxim] is the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.” Id.
at n.21.
129. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
130. See discussion supra Part IV.C-D.
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federal courts had held the same, including in Kramas v. Security Gas
& Oil, Inc. 131 The court in Kramas, however, failed to offer any
support for its proposition that inquiry notice triggers the limitations
period under section 25506. 132 The court simply stated that “[t]he
limitations period under 15 U.S.C. § 77m [§ 13 of the Securities Act]
does not begin to run until plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the
violation or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered them,” and that “[t]he same principle applies . . . in view of
the similarity in language, we think also under [section 25506 of the
California Corporations Code].” 133 The fatal flaw in this logic is that
the language of section 25506 is different from the language of § 13 of
the Securities Act: section 25506 does not say “in the exercise of
reasonable diligence.” 134 This distinction is critical because while §
13 of the Securities Act arguably incorporates inquiry notice by its
terms, section 25506 certainly does not. 135 Thus, Deveny erroneously
treated § 13 of the Securities Act and section 25506 the same.
The Deveny court declined to follow a prior California court of
appeal decision in Eisenbaum that rejected inquiry notice under
section 25507–the statute of limitations for actions alleging failure to
qualify a securities transaction in California. 136 In Eisenbaum, the
court held that the statute of limitations under section 25507
commences upon actual discovery of the facts underlying the elements
of the violation, not upon inquiry notice. 137 The Eisenbaum court
aimed its primary focus at the language of the statute, noting, “[b]y its
plain language, the statute requires actual knowledge, not just ‘inquiry

131. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815 (Ct. App. 2006);
Kramas v Security Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. Kramas, 672 F.2d 766.
133. Id. at 770.
134. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West
2014).
135. Some argue that the “reasonable diligence” language expresses a
constructive discovery standard, not an inquiry notice standard, and in the absence
of such language, the statute should be read as requiring actual discovery of the facts
constituting the violation. See Cosenza, supra note 35, at 727-32.
136. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810.
137. Eisenbaum v. W. Energy Res., Inc., 267 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11-12 (Ct. App.
1990).
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notice.’” 138 The court further supported its conclusion by contrasting
the language of section 25507 with that of section 25506.1, which
establishes the “statute of limitations for fraud liability imposed upon
those who ‘expertise’ a prospectus.” 139 Under section 25506.1, the
statute of limitations begins to run one year “after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”140
The court recognized “the significant and controlling distinction in the
statutory language.” 141
The Deveny court’s refusal to give the Eisenbaum decision any
weight is difficult to reconcile given that the exact same “significant
and controlling distinction in the statutory language” 142 is present in
section 25506. 143 The Deveny court distinguished Eisenbaum on the
basis of the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant in Eisenbaum. 144 But the court in Eisenbaum said, “the
lack of a fiduciary relationship . . . would not be decisive on the
statute of limitations issue.” 145 Therefore, the rationale employed by
the Eisenbaum court is equally persuasive as applied to section 25506,
and the court in Deveny should have followed Eisenbaum.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. (citing Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506.1
(West 2014)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Section 25507 says that actions must be “brought before the expiration
of . . . one year after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting such
violation.” Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507 (West
2014). Section 25506, subdivision b, says that actions must be “brought before the
expiration of . . . two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the violation.” Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE §
25506(b) (West 2014). Section 25506.1, on the other hand, says that actions must
be “brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of
reasonable diligence.” Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE §
25506.1 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
144. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 816-17 (Ct. App. 2006).
145. Eisenbaum, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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B. The Textualist Interpretation of Section 25506
Given that Deveny was not well-reasoned, it should be overruled
and section 25506 should be interpreted without regard to Deveny’s
holding. “‘The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself.’” 146 “A basic canon of statutory
construction is that words should be interpreted as taking their
ordinary and plain meaning.” 147 Section 25506 provides that an
action for securities fraud must be brought “before the expiration of
five years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the
expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.” 148 The
ordinary and plain meaning of “facts constituting the violation” is
facts corresponding to each element of the violation. 149 Inquiry
notice—the point at which facts suggest wrongdoing and would lead a
reasonably diligent investor to investigate further—is not necessarily
the point at which the plaintiff would have already discovered the
Thus, inquiry notice is
“facts constituting the violation.” 150
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the text of section 25506.
Another canon of statutory interpretation is that “words undefined
in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their
common-law meanings.” 151 At common law, “discovery” of a cause
of action occurs not only when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of
the facts underlying the claim, but also when the plaintiff has reason
146. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
147. United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb.
1981).
148. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West
2014).
149. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (“Scienter
is assuredly a ‘fact.’. . . And this ‘fact’ of scienter ‘constitut[es]’ an important and
necessary element of a § 10(b) ‘violation.’” (alteration in original)).
150. Id. at 651. For example, in Wright v. Bloom, the plaintiffs realized they
had been defrauded several months before they even became aware that they had
participated in a securities offering. Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012).
151. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 320 (2012).
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to suspect a factual basis for the action. 152 The court in Deveny noted
that section 338, subdivision (d), of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, which requires that an action for common law fraud be
asserted within three years of discovery of the facts constituting the
fraud, states that the limitations period begins to run upon discovery of
facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect fraud.153
The court concluded that inquiry notice is consistent with the common
law understanding of the term “discovery” in statutes of limitations.154
But statutes are not interpreted in isolation. 155 Read in context,
“discovery” here cannot implicate inquiry notice. 156 The presumption
of consistent usage reveals that section 25506 does not require
reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff. 157 When a statute
contains a provision, the omission of that provision in another statute
concerning the same subject matter cannot be ignored. 158 As the court
noted in Eisenbaum, section 25506.1, which establishes the limitations
period for fraud claims against those who “expertise” a prospectus,
requires that claims be brought “within one year after the discovery of
the facts constituting the violation, or after such discovery should
have been made by reasonable diligence.” 159 The fact that section
25506 omits the “reasonable diligence” clause is significant,
especially given that section 25506.1 immediately follows section

152. 43 CAL. JUR. 3D Limitation of Actions § 34 (2011).
153. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 816 (Ct. App. 2006).
154. Id.
155. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988) (“The meaning of
a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be
construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be
harmonized to the extent possible.”).
156. See Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 656 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 151, at 170-73.
158. People v. Kuhn, 31 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (Ct. App. 1963) (“Where a
statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of
such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to
show that a different intention existed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
People ex rel. Paganini v. Town of Corte Madera, 218 P.2d 810, 813 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950))).
159. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506.1 (West
2014) (emphasis added).
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25506. 160 Thus, properly interpreted, section 25506 requires the
plaintiff to have discovered the facts constituting the violation before
the limitations period begins to run. 161
Moreover, the presumption against surplusage supports
distinguishing sections 25506 and 25506.1. 162 If the term “discovery”
in section 25506 implicates inquiry notice, the phrase “or after
discovery should have been made by reasonable diligence” in section
25506.1 is rendered meaningless. 163 Such an interpretation violates
the rules that “significance should be given to every word and phrase
of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose,” 164 and that “‘[every]
statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law
of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have
effect.’” 165
C. The Intent-Based Interpretation of Section 25506
The Deveny court emphasized the court’s focus on legislative
intent when interpreting statutes. 166 A true interpreter, in seeking the

160. See SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 151, at 173 (“[T]he more
connection the cited statute has with the statute under consideration, the more
plausible the argument becomes. If it was enacted at the same time, and dealt with
the same subject, the argument could even be persuasive.”).
161. Cf. Eisenbaum v. W. Energy Res., Inc., 267 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11 (Ct. App.
1990).
162. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1967)
(“In statutory construction there is a presumption against surplusage and in favor of
a meaning for all parts . . . .”).
163. Cf. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 656 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that “discovery” in 15 U.S.C. § 77m “cannot mean constructive
discovery, since that would render superfluous the phrase ‘or after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence’”).
164. Buchwald v. Superior Court of S.F., 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369 (Ct. App.
1967) (citing Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, 335 P.2d 672, 675-76
(Cal. 1959)).
165. Rees v. Layton, 86 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Stafford
v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 249 P.2d 241, 245-56 (Cal. 1952)).
166. See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815-16 (Ct. App.
2006) (“‘Our function . . . is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the law. . . . In general, the legislative purpose behind such
statutes is to prevent plaintiffs from asserting stale claims. At the same time, public
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legislative intent, would look only to the words of the statute to glean
the legislative intent, because the legislature chose those words to
carry out its purpose. 167 Courts and advocates often seek the
legislative intent by looking beyond the words of the statute and
considering the context in which it was enacted. 168 And in doing so
here, the same conclusion is reached as the one reached in Part B,
supra. Even if one were to seek the legislative intent by looking
beyond the text and considering the context in which section 25506
was enacted, one would have to conclude that inquiry notice should be
rejected.
Section 25506, as amended in 2004, is virtually identical to 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b). 169 “[W]here provisions in the federal and state laws
are identical and similar in language federal interpretations are
persuasive in determining how the state law is to be applied.” 170
Under this rationale, the Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice
in Merck should apply to section 25506. Even more persuasive, the
California legislature intentionally copied the federal statute when it

policy favors the resolution of claims on the merits.’” (quoting Debro v. L.A.
Raiders, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 335 (Ct. App. 2001))).
167. See Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 672 (1988).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. Unit
B Feb. 1981) (“[C]onsideration of legislative history is proper in determination of
the meaning of words used in statutes, even where the meaning of the words appears
to be plain.”); Hope v. Contractors’ State License Bd., 39 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (Ct.
App. 1964) (noting that a court “may look to legislative committee reports as
extrinsic aid in the interpretation of the legislative purpose in the enactment of a
statute”); Kelly v. Kane, 94 P.2d 384, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (“[A] statute should
be construed in the light of the history of the times and the conditions which
prompted its enactment.”).
169. Section 25506, as amended in 2004, allows actions to be brought “before
the expiration of five years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or
the expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.” Corporate Securities Law of
1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 2014). Under Sarbanes-Oxley, a private
right of action for a claim of fraud under the federal securities laws “may be brought
not later than the earlier of— (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b).
170. Coast Oyster Co. v. Perluss, 32 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743 (Ct. App. 1963).
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amended section 25506. 171
The California Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that under Sarbanes-Oxley, “a private right of action
for claims of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a securities regulation may be brought not later than
the earlier of two years after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation or five years after such violation.” 172 The legislature’s stated
purpose in amending section 25506 was to “conform California’s
statute of limitations for securities fraud actions to the federal statute
of limitations as set by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, so that state
law is at least as protective of California investors as federal law.” 173
On the surface, it seems strange that the legislature was concerned
with conforming California’s securities fraud statute of limitations to
the Exchange Act statute of limitations because section 25401 was
modeled after the Securities Act, not the Exchange Act. 174 Perhaps
the legislature believed that Sarbanes-Oxley’s extended statute of
limitations applied to claims under both Acts. 175 It is also possible
that the legislature recognized that while section 25401 mirrored §
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, the statute of limitations set forth in
section 25506 tracked the language of § 9(e) of the Exchange Act.176
171. Unlicensed Securities Brokers: Hearing on A.B. 2167 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Cal. 2004), available at
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_
20040623_121942_sen_comm.html.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id. at 4.
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. This would not be an unreasonable assumption, because, although section
804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically refers to the Exchange Act, (“a private
right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined
in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”), at least one court has
held that the Supreme Court’s holding in Merck, which interpreted 28 U.S.C. §
1658(b), applies to § 13 of the Securities Act. See Pension Trust Fund for Operat’g
Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir.
2013).
176. Subsection (e) of § 9 of the Exchange Act was redesignated as subsection
(f) in 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929X(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). It requires that actions for
manipulation of security prices under § 9 of the Exchange Act be “brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation.” Exchange Act §
9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2010).
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Either way, the legislature made clear that its priority was to ensure
that state law would be at least as protective of California investors as
federal law. 177
Inquiry notice frustrates that purpose because it discourages
investors from filing meritorious claims and prevents fraud suits from
being decided on the merits. 178 It follows that rejecting inquiry notice
in favor of a discovery-based standard will protect investors by
encouraging plaintiffs to seek redress on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated aggrieved investors.
Therefore, because the
California legislature intended to enhance investor protection when it
amended the statute of limitations to conform to § 1658(b), the
Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice for § 1658(b) should
extend to California’s statute of limitations.
D. Unjust Consequences of Inquiry Notice
The unjust consequences of inquiry notice provide another
justification for overruling Deveny. First, inquiry notice unfairly
rewards fraudsters who succeed in concealing their fraudulent
schemes. 179 Second, inquiry notice deters securities fraud victims
from seeking redress, which subverts the policies behind private
enforcement of securities laws. 180 Third, the recent amendment of
section 25401 will make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to plead
securities fraud sufficiently, so a statute of limitations that allows
plaintiffs enough time to gather facts is now more important than
ever. 181

177. Unlicensed Securities Brokers: Hearing on A.B. 2167 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2004), available at
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_
20040623_ 121942_sen_comm.html.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
179. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
180. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
181. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3.
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1. Inquiry Notice Unfairly Rewards Fraudsters
Inquiry notice increases the likelihood that securities fraud
victims, by no fault of their own, will lose any chance of recovery. 182
An example of how promoters can mask their fraud long enough to
afford the absolute protection of inquiry notice is the use of “selfdirected IRAs.” 183 This type of scam involves convincing investors to
move assets into a self-directed IRA supposedly held by a custodian
but which is actually created and owned by the fraudster. 184 This type
of fraud is appealing to a scam artist because the “financial penalty for
early withdrawal may cause investors to be more passive or to keep
funds in a fraudulent scheme longer.” 185
Affinity fraud is another example of how fraudsters can employ
cunning devices to prevent their victims from filing suit before the
statute of limitations expires. Affinity fraud occurs when fraudsters
exploit members of a particular group by professing to be a member of
that same group. 186 Fraudsters market their schemes to group
members who are more willing to “trust someone who is perceived to
have a common interest, beliefs or background.” 187 Victims of
affinity fraud are less likely to suspect that they have been defrauded
because “[m]embers of the group often find it hard to believe that ‘one
of their own’ could be scamming them.” 188 Inquiry notice, though,
gives rise to a duty of inquiry “when the circumstances would suggest
to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been
defrauded.” 189
These two examples illustrate that inquiry notice rewards
fraudsters who use cunning methods to ensure that their victims will
not take affirmative steps to discover the fraud. Victims of these types
182. See, e.g., Wright v. Bloom, Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 170679 WHA, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 170679, *10 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing securities fraud claim because
plaintiffs were on inquiry notice more than two years before filing their claim).
183. Top Investor Threats, supra note 28.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 822 (Ct. App. 2006).
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of schemes are also victims of inquiry notice. When they eventually
do discover the fraud, their inability to see the early warning signs of
fraud (the “storm warnings”) bars their meritorious claims and
eliminates their chance of recovery.
2. Inquiry Notice Deters Securities Fraud Victims
From Seeking Redress
The Fourth Circuit stated that inquiry notice encourages plaintiffs
to take “the actions necessary to bring the fraud to light” and gives a
defendant the “security of knowing when legal action against him has
been foreclosed.” 190
However, these justifications erroneously
assume that aggrieved investors are not already sufficiently
incentivized to promptly file suit. 191 Courts have also suggested that
inquiry notice is essential to prevent investors from taking unfair
advantage of the protections of the securities laws by postponing
action on an alleged fraud, pending the outcome of their
investments. 192 But the assumption that securities fraud victims who
are aware of the fraud wait to file suit is misguided because “[i]t is
more likely that plaintiffs [do] not know about the fraud, rather than
that they [sit] on their hands with the information.” 193 Moreover, the
strict pleading requirements for fraud “strongly discourage private
plaintiffs from bringing marginal suits.” 194
190. Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1993).
191. Securities fraud plaintiffs are already highly motivated to investigate and
file their claims as soon as possible for several reasons. See Kaufman &
Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1589-90 (noting several motivating factors, such as
the presence of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs encouraging plaintiffs to
investigate and file because these institutional investors often have sufficient
resources to conduct their own prefiling investigation; filing early correlates with a
stronger likelihood of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; and any delay
comes at the cost of increased unavailability of evidence).
192. See Brumbaugh, 985 F.2d at 162 (“In sum, plaintiffs should not be able to
coerce settlements simply because aging has improved an originally meritless
claim . . . .”); Tregenza v. Great American Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“These plaintiffs waited patiently to sue. If the stock rebounded from
the cellar they would have investment profits, and if it stayed in the cellar they
would have legal damages. Heads I win, tails you lose. This tactic is discouraged
by the doctrine of inquiry notice.”).
193. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1594.
194. Rose, supra note 29, at 2220.
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The uncertainty regarding whether the statute of limitations will
bar a potential plaintiff’s claim can prove costly because inquiry
notice is generally an issue left to the finder of fact. 195 Even where a
plaintiff has a strong case for fraud, the plaintiff must weigh the
significant cost of pursuing litigation, starting from pre-discovery
through trial, against the possibility that the plaintiff may lose at trial
based on the statute of limitations. Thus, inquiry notice reduces a
fraud victim’s incentive to pursue redress and reduces the chance that
cases will be decided on the merits of the claim.
The SEC recently implemented § 201(a) of the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act by lifting the 80-year ban on general solicitation
for private securities offerings. 196 Now, certain types of investment
schemes can be advertised on billboards, through the Internet, and
other media. 197
States are the primary regulator of private
offerings, 198 and state regulators predict that lifting the ban on general
solicitation will lead to more enforcement actions. 199 State regulators
will not have the resources necessary to handle the sudden wave of
fraud perpetrated through general solicitation, leaving aggrieved
investors to rely on private actions to seek redress. 200 The importance
of private enforcement of the securities laws on the overall economy
will become even more pronounced. 201 If fraudsters are not deterred
by private enforcement, securities fraud will become more prevalent,
and state regulators will become even more overwhelmed in their
efforts to protect investors. 202 In light of the increased importance of
195. Hernandez v. Vasquez, No. B244533, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
8074, at *22 (Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2013).
196. 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, & 242 (2013).
197. Id.
198. ABSHURE, supra note 26, at 2-3.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Outmanned and Outgunned:
Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections,
Address at the North American Securities Administrators Association Annual
NASAA/SEC
19(d)
Conference
(April
16,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515400#P55_10421.
201. See discussion supra Part II.
202. In his speech explaining why he voted against the proposal eliminating
the prohibition on general solicitation, Commissioner Aguilar noted that “it is now
more important than ever that defrauded investors have the ability to seek redress
against those who participate in defrauding them.” Aguilar, supra note 200. He
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private rights of action for securities fraud, California should reject
inquiry notice because it discourages investors from filing meritorious
securities fraud claims.
3. California’s Amended Securities Fraud Statute
The recent remodeling of the anti-fraud provision of California
securities law conforms it to SEC Rule 10b-5. 203 If California courts
interpret the amended law consistently with how federal courts have
interpreted the now virtually identical Rule 10b-5, aggrieved investors
will now face even more overwhelming pleading hurdles, 204 because
plaintiffs bringing suit under Rule 10b-5 must plead judicially
imposed elements—scienter, reliance, and causation—which have
never before been required under California securities law. 205 The
California legislature has asserted that the purpose of the amendment
was “to ensure consistency with more comprehensive, federal antifraud statutes.” 206 Thus, the legislative history evidences an intent to
adopt Rule 10b-5, including the judicially-imposed elements. 207

also stated that: “Private actions give fraud victims the ability to recover their losses.
It is unrealistic to expect that state regulators or the SEC will have the resources to
police all securities frauds or go after every fraudster. Investors should have the
ability to protect themselves.” Id.
203. See supra note 2.
204. Mugmon et al., supra note 3. Defense attorneys will certainly advocate
for a Rule 10b-5 pleading standard, and it is likely that courts will read the 10b-5
elements into the amended statutes given that “by amending an unambiguous statute
the Legislature may be assumed to have intended to change the existing law.”
Gaumer v. County of Tehama, 55 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778 (Ct. App. 1967) (citing Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utilit. Comm’n., 379 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Cal. 1963)); see
also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Geyer, 55 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (Ct. App. 1967) (“It is a
settled principle of statutory construction that a material change in the phraseology
of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as showing an intention on the part of
the Legislature to change the meaning of the statute.”).
205. Brown, supra note 4.
206. S.B. 538 Bill Analysis, Assemb. Comm. on Banking and Fin. (June 10,
2013),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_538_cfa_
20130607_121212_asm_comm.html.
207. Keith Paul Bishop, Die Verwandlung: How the Legislature Likely Raised
the Bar on Securities Fraud Actions, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2013/09/die-verwandlung-howthe-legislature-likely-raised-the-bar-on-securities-fraud-actions/.
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In California, the “facts constituting the fraud . . . must be alleged
factually and specifically.” 208 Moreover, in securities fraud claims,
the court accepts as true only “properly pleaded” material facts, not
“contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” 209 But if, as
Deveny holds, circumstances suggesting the mere possibility of fraud
are sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period, 210 a
securities fraud victim could easily run out of time to file his claim
before he can gather enough facts through pre-discovery investigation
to draft a complaint that meets the heightened pleading standard.
After all, “‘[c]oncealment is inherent in most securities fraud cases,’”
and “extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within”
the limitations period. 211
The requirement of scienter itself creates a “pleading trap” for
plaintiffs. 212 Scienter is likely more difficult to discover than the other
elements of fraud. 213 Uncovering evidence of a defendant’s mental
state in a pre-discovery investigation is a formidable task. 214 Plaintiffs
may only point to facts suggestive of scienter that are available within

208. Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr.
3d 199, 210 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comm. on
Children’s Telev., Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1983)).
209. Moss v. Kroner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 1985)).
210. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 817 (Ct. App. 2006)
(“Inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period . . . .”).
“Inquiry notice arises in a securities action when circumstances suggest to an
investor of ordinary intelligence the possibility that he has been defrauded.” Id. at
821.
211. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing against the three-year statute of
repose).
212. For further discussion of this dilemma facing plaintiffs even after
Merck’s rejection of inquiry notice, see Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at
1581-86.
213. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 657-58 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Determining when the plaintiff should have uncovered an untrue
assertion in a registration statement or prospectus is much simpler than assessing
when a plaintiff should have learned that the defendant deliberately misled him
using a deceptive device . . . ..”).
214. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1578-79.
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the two-year window, or their action may be dismissed based on the
statute of limitations.215
Another reason California should reject inquiry notice is that with
the reworking of the anti-fraud provision, the justification for a
shortened statute of limitations is gone. The legislature created a
statute of limitations for securities fraud shorter than that available
under common law fraud because the anti-fraud provisions of the
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 relieved victims of establishing
some of the elements of common law fraud. 216 But the judiciallyimposed elements of Rule 10b-5 closely resemble the elements of
common law fraud. 217 Keeping the truncated inquiry notice statute of
limitations, while still requiring plaintiffs to essentially plead common
law fraud, would frustrate the purpose of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws. Congress has recognized that:
[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and
global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors,
directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs. 218

Inquiry notice, though, prevents defrauded investors from bringing
meritorious suits. 219
One could argue that because California’s anti-fraud provision
was originally modeled after § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, the
Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice for the Exchange Act’s
statute of limitations has no bearing on section 25506, notwithstanding
the recent amendment to section 25401. However, whether inquiry
notice is sufficient to start the limitations period for actions brought
under the Securities Act has been called into question since Merck.
The Third Circuit recently rejected inquiry notice in favor of a
215. Id. at 1581-86.
216. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1977).
217. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt369/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt369.pdf.
219. See discussion supra Part IV.D.2.
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discovery-based standard for securities fraud claims brought under the
Securities Act, holding that Merck’s rejection of inquiry notice is not
limited to the Exchange Act. 220 The court’s well-reasoned opinion
rests on four grounds. First, both the Exchange Act’s statute of
limitations (28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)) and the Securities Act’s statute of
limitations (§ 13) “incorporate the word ‘discovery’ which . . . [is] a
term of art representing the discovery rule.” 221 Second, while the
latter statute references “‘the exercise of due diligence’ . . . . [n]either
statute includes any language suggesting that the limitations period
begins to run before discovery.” 222 Third, the court noted that the
Supreme Court has treated both statutes of limitations as
“interchangeable.” 223
Finally, the Third Circuit critically analyzed the purpose of the
limitations period, and concluded that inquiry notice is inconsistent
with that purpose. 224 “[I]t is logical to link the statute of limitations
standard with the pleading standard; the purpose of statutes of
limitations is to prevent stale claims, but claims cannot be stale until
they have accrued, and claims cannot accrue until they can be
adequately pled.” 225 The court thus concluded that a plaintiff cannot
be “‘deemed’” to have “‘discovered’” facts constituting the violation
for the purposes of beginning the limitations period “‘until a
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about
that fact to adequately it in a complaint . . . with sufficient detail and
particularity to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’” 226
Like federal securities fraud claims, securities fraud claims under
California law must meet heightened pleading standards.227
220. Pension Trust Fund for Operat’g Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization
Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2013).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 275.
225. Id.
226. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting City of Pontiac Gen. Empl. Ret. Sys. V.
MBIA, Inc., 637 F.d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2011)).
227. Olenicoff v. UBS AG, No. SACV 08-1029 AG (RNBx), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14056, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009) (claim for securities fraud under
California Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25501 dismissed because
plaintiffs failed “to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”).
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Moreover, the importance of private actions under the federal
securities laws applies with equal force to state securities laws. 228
Therefore, the policies articulated by the Third Circuit which support
extending Merck’s holding to claims under both the Securities and
Exchange Acts also support extending Merck’s holding to the
securities fraud claims under California law, even if the judiciallyimposed elements of Rule 10b-5 are not grafted onto section 25401.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims
from being brought, but under inquiry notice, a claim may be deemed
“stale” before it even accrues. This is both illogical and unfair. The
inquiry notice standard has no place in section 25506 because the
imposition of a duty of inquiry conflicts with the text of the statute.
Inquiry notice made its way into California securities law during the
befuddling era before a discreet statute of limitations applied to causes
of action under Rule 10b-5. Its unquestioned reign continues only
because courts have not critically analyzed the California court of
appeal’s holding in Deveny.
Private enforcement plays a crucial role in the deterrence-based
scheme of securities regulation. But the policies underlying the rights
of aggrieved investors to bring private actions against perpetrators of
securities fraud are frustrated by a limitations period that may expire
before the investors can adequately plead each element of securities
fraud. In light of the California legislature’s reformation of the antifraud provision, which will likely require plaintiffs to plead and prove
reliance, causation, and scienter, it is more crucial than ever that
California reject inquiry notice.
Shauna C. Güner*

228. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt369/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt369.pdf.
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